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Woltz: Excessive Fines Clause Revisited: Punitive Damages after Browning

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE REVISITED:
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER BROWNINGFERRIS INDUSTRIES v. KELCO
DISPOSAL, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that the excessive fines clause of the eighth
amendment does not limit the award of punitive damages to private parties in civil actions,2 thus resolving an issue that had been the subject of
two prior inconclusive cases before the Supreme Court3 and had generated much interest from the legal and business communities.4 Although
1. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
2. Id. at 2914.
3. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986).
4. See Note, Possible ConstitutionalLimits on Punitive Damages: Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v. Crenshaw, 24 TULSA L.J. 429, 430 n.8 (1989). See also Boston, Punitive Damagesand the Eighth
Amendment: Application of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 667 (1988).
The interest generated by the Browning-Ferriscase is suggested by the number of amici curiae
submitting briefs to the Court. Briefs were submitted by: the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States; the Product Liability Advisory Council; the National Association of
Manufacturers of the United States; Arthur Andersen & Co.; Arthur Young & Co.; Coopers &
Lybrand; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells; Ernst & Whinney; Peat Marwick Main & Co.; Price
Waterhouse; Touche Ross & Co.; CBS, Inc.; Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Dow Jones & Co.; the Hearst
Corp.; the National Broadcasting Co.; the Time Inc. Magazine Co.; the Tribune Co.; the Washington Post; the Associated Press; the American Society of Newspaper Editors; the Association of
American Publishers; the National Association of Broadcasters; the Society of Professional Journalists; the American National Red Cross; the American Tort Reform Association; the Association for
California Tort Reform; the Council of Community Blood Centers; General Electric Co.; the Merchandising Group of Sears, Roebuck & Co.; the Texas Civil Justice League; the Alliance of American Insurers; the American Council of Life Insurance; the American Insurance Association; the
Health Insurance Association of America; the National Association of Independent Insurers; Navistar International Transportation Corp.; the National Association of Mutual Insurance Cos.; the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association; the American Medical Association; Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.; the City of New York; Metromedia, Inc.; the United States Chamber of Commerce; the
National Association of Manufacturers; the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States; the Business Roundtable; the American Corporate Counsel Association; the Risk and Insurance Management Society; the Product Liability Alliance; Bethlehem Steel Corp.; the Atlantic Legal
Foundation; the Golden Rule Insurance Co.; Allstate Insurance Co.; Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.;
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the Court's decision in Browning-Ferrisforecloses future eighth amendment challenges of punitive damage awards to private parties, the decision leaves open the question of whether punitive damages awarded to
the government in a civil action are subject to limits under the excessive
fines clause. The decision also provides further evidence that the Court
will be open to future challenges to punitive damage awards based on due
process considerations.'
II.
A.

THE BACKGROUND OF BROWNING-FERRIS

Facts

Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) is a waste-collection and wastedisposal business operating throughout the United States.' In 1980 an
employee of BFI's Burlington, Vermont subsidiary left BFI and began a
competing waste collection business called Kelco Disposal, Inc. (Kelco).8
Kelco captured forty-three percent of the Burlington market by 1982,
leading BFI to begin a campaign of price reductions designed to drive
Kelco out of business. 9

Kelco responded by bringing suit in United States district court for
attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act' 0 and for
Johnson & Higgins; the Defense Research Institute; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith; Prudential-Bache Securities; Shearson Lehman Hutton; the Insurance Consumer Action Network; the California Trial Lawyers Association; Martha Hoffman Sanders; the Consumers Union of the United
States; the Consumer Federation of America; the National Consumers League; the National Women's Health Network; the Center for Science in the Public Interest; the United States Public Interest Research Group; Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; the Women's Equity Action League; the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America; and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. Docket of
Proceedings and Orders at 1-2, Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909
(1989) (No. 88-556).
The issues raised in the Browning-Ferriscase should be viewed as part of the larger "tort reform" movement that seeks to limit the scope of potential liability under the current tort system
because of its purported detrimental economic and social effects. In its brief to the Court, for example, BFI argued that the judgment against it should be subject to the excessive fines clause in part as
a way of controlling what it described as "[r]unaway punitive damages awards" that are not subject
to adequate jury guidelines or judicial scrutiny. Brief for the Petitioners at 10-13, Browning-Ferris
(No. 88-556). BFI also asserted that "this case... is the tip of an iceberg with which the American
legal system is increasingly colliding." Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Browning-Ferris(No.
88-556). See also Browning-Ferris,109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.... The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on
the research and development of new products.").
5. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
7. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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tortious interference with contractual relations under Vermont law."I A
jury found BFI liable on both claims, awarding Kelco $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive damages.12 The court denied BFI's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial,
or remittitur and entered a judgment for Kelco in the amount of
14
$6,066,082.74,1 3 or 117 times Kelco's actual damages.
B.

The Court of Appeals' Opinion

BFI appealed the award of damages to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the jury's verdict. 5 The
court of appeals found that the punitive damage award was not excessive
as a matter of Vermont law, which, according to the court, "invests a
jury with enormous discretion to award punitive damages when it decides a party has acted maliciously,"'16 and has "refused to require that
there be some kind of mystical ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages."17 The court also briefly addressed BFI's constitutional claim
that the punitive damage award violated the excessive fines clause, holding that even if the eighth amendment applied, the punitive damage
award was not so disproportionate to Kelco's actual damages as to be
unconstitutionally excessive. 8
C. Issues Presented to the United States Supreme Court
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, BFI raised two issues: first, whether the court of appeals applied an erroneous test in sustaining Kelco's predatory pricing claim against BFI,' 9 and second,
"[w]hether an award of $6,000,000 in punitive damages, amounting to
11. Browning-Ferris, 109 S.Ct. at 2913.
12. Id.
13. Id. In the alternative, the district court awarded $153,438 in treble damages and $212,500
in attorneys' fees and costs under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S.Ct. 2909 (1989).
Kelco sensibly elected to receive the larger state-law award. Id. at 411.
14. Browning-Ferris, 109 S.Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S.
Ct. 2909 (1989).
16. Id. at 409 (citing Pezzano v. Bonneau, 133 Vt. 88, 90, 329 A.2d 659, 660 (1974)).
17. Id. at 410 (citing Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon See., Inc., 756 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.
1985) and Pezzano v. Bonneau, 133 Vt. 88, 92, 329 A.2d 659, 661 (1974)).
18. Id.
19. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit at I, Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2909 (1989) (No. 88-556).
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more than 100 times the plaintiff's actualdamages from a purely economic tort, is excessive under the Eighth Amendment or otherwise."20
The Court granted certiorari only on the second issue.21
D. The Law of Punitive Damages Before Browning-Ferris
Punitive damages have a long and sometimes controversial history
in Anglo-American law and have been subject to a variety of legal and
legislative attacks.22 Although state common law often restricts excessive punitive damage awards at least in theory,2 3 and although many
states have recently passed statutes that place limits on punitive damages, 24 there are few general constitutional restraints on punitive damages. Recent Supreme Court decisions restrict punitive damages in only
two contexts: first, when punitive damages in defamation cases conflict
with the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression,2" and sec-

ond, when punitive damages levied by the government in a civil case constitute double jeopardy following a prior criminal conviction.2 6
III.
A.

THE DECISION OF THE CASE

The Majority Opinion

In the majority opinion by Justice Blackmun,27 the Court held on
20. Id.
21. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 527 (1988). It was somewhat
surprising that the Court granted certiorari on this issue after having refused the previous term on
prudential grounds to consider whether the excessive fines clause limited punitive damages, stating
that considering the issue "would short-circuit a number of less intrusive, and possibly more appropriate, resolutions" by the state legislatures and courts. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
108 S.Ct. 1645, 1651 (1988) (Marshall, J.).
22. For a brief survey of punitive damages in Anglo-American law, see Note, supra note 4, at
434-39 and authorities cited therein.
23. See, eg., FDICv. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 100 (N.D. Il. 1988) ("[a] large body
of common law has developed and is developing ...whereby meaningful standards of comparison
are being created"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Ghiardi,
Punitive DamageAwards-An ExpandedJudicialRole, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 33 (1988); 2 J.GHIARDI
& J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 18.01-18.10 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
One recent study found that "most large punitive damage awards were reduced by post-trial activity,
and only half of the money originally awarded by juries in the sampled cases eventually ended up in
the plaintiffs' hands." M. PETERSON, S.SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS 30 (1987). This result may, of course, reflect the tendency of such cases to settle rather
than any active review of punitive damage awards by the courts.
24. See Note, supra note 4, at 447 nn.129-30. See also AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASS'N,
ATRA LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE BOOK (1986 & Supp. 1989).
25. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
26. See United States v. Halper, 109 S.Ct. 1892 (1989).
27. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Brennan also issued a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justices O'Connor and Stevens dissented to the part of the Court's opinion dealing with

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss2/5

4

Woltz: Excessive Fines Clause Revisited: Punitive Damages after Browning
1989]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

historical and policy grounds that the excessive fines clause of the eighth
amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards to private parties.2 8 The opinion did, however, suggest that the excessive fines clause
might apply when the government recovers punitive damages as plaintiff
in a civil suit.2 9 The Court also left open the possibility that it might
impose constitutional limits on punitive damage awards in the future, but
on due process rather than eighth amendment grounds.30
After reciting the facts of the case, Justice Blackmun engaged in an
extensive analysis of the historical foundations of the excessive fines
clause and, in particular, of the historical meaning of fines. Justice
Blackmun noted that although the eighth amendment received little discussion when it was ratified by the first Congress, the Bill of Rights as a
whole was adopted to limit the powers of government against the individual citizen and not to limit the rights of one citizen against another.3 1
The Court buttressed this view by tracing the words of the eighth amendment from the Virginia Declaration of Rights 32 and the English Bill of
Rights3 3 to the limits placed on medieval amercements in Magna Carta. a4
The Court's analysis of these historical restrictions on fines led to the
conclusion that although such restrictions applied in civil as well as criminal contexts, they applied only to the sovereign, not to private parties.3 5
Thus, the Court found, when the eighth amendment was adopted, the
intention was not to place limits on awards to private plaintiffs such as
Kelco, but to prevent the federal government from imposing oppressive
fines on its citizens whether through civil or criminal process. 36 The
Court also concluded that the principle behind the eighth amendmentthat there be limits to the government's punitive powers over the individual-was not implicated by the award of punitive damages to a private
party, and declined to extend the application of the excessive fines clause
the excessive fines question. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2912
(1989).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2914.
30. Id. at 2921.
31. Id. at 2914-16.
32. Id. at 2916 (citing the Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. I, § 9 (1776)).
33. Id. (citing the English Bill of Rights, I W. & M., 2d Sess., ch. 2, cl. 10 (1689)).
34. Id. at 2916-19 (citing Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 9, ch. 14 (1225)). Amercements were
"payments to the Crown, and were required of individuals who were 'in the King's mercy,' because
of some act offensive to the Crown." Id. at 2917 (citing 2 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 519 (2d ed. 1899)). Although they were paid to the Crown, amercements had qualities of both civil and criminal penalties. See id. at 2927 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2917-19.
36. Id. at 2919.
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to BFI.3 7
Finally, the Court, in a portion of the opinion joined by all nine
justices, 38 rejected BFI's arguments that punitive damages awarded to
Kelco violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
were excessive as a matter of federal common law.39 The Court found
some precedential support for applying due process limits to civil damage
awards, at least when "made pursuant to a statutory scheme"; but because BFI failed to raise its due process claims below, the Court stated
that the question of whether the due process clause limits punitive damage awards "must await another day."4 0 The Court also found no federal
common law basis for holding the punitive damages awarded against BFI
excessive on the ground that federalism concerns require that such matters be governed by state law.41
B. Justice Brennan's Concurrence
In his opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, emphasized that he concurred with the majority opinion "on the understanding
that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause
constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by
private parties."'4 2 Justice Brennan expressed serious doubts about the
constitutional soundness of allowing juries to award punitive damages
without providing guidelines for what amount might be appropriate.4 3
He stated that he "would look longer and harder at an award of punitive
damages based on ...skeletal guidance than ... one situated within a
range of penalties as to which responsible officials had deliberated and
then agreed."'
37. Id. at 2920. Because it held that the excessive fines clause did not apply in this case, the
majority declined to decide whether the eighth amendment applies to the states through incorporation by the fourteenth amendment, or whether its protections extend to corporations. Id. at 2921
n.22.
38. Id. at 2912, 2921.
39. Id. at 2921-23.
40. Id. at 2921.
41. Id. at 2921-23.
42. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. Id. Justice Brennan seems to be contrasting statutes that, for example, set treble damages
as the proper measure of punishment for a given act with the common law practice of allowing juries
to award punitive damages in any proportion to actual damages that they wish, with little guidance
from the court. Statutes setting standards for awarding punitive damages in particular situations
might be seen as giving defendants at least a sort of legislative due process that matched the punishment with the offense.
44. Id. It is possible to read a potential disagreement with the majority opinion into Justice
Brennan's comments. Justice Brennan suggested that punitive damages awarded without judicial or
legislative guidelines might be subject to closer scrutiny under the due process clause than similar
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C. Justice O'Connor'sDissent
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented to the majority's holding that the excessive fines clause does not limit punitive damage awards to private parties.4 5 Justice O'Connor began her opinion with
a dramatic description of the part punitive damages play in what is described by its proponents as the "tort crisis," and seemed to suggest that
applying the excessive fines clause to punitive damages would be a proper
way of dealing with the "crisis."" Justice O'Connor then argued that
the excessive fines clause should be applied to the states,4 7 and its protections extended to corporations in a civil context.4"
Like the majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor relied on a detailed
analysis of the history and meaning of the excessive fines clause to support her argument. Unlike the majority, however, Justice O'Connor
found historical support for the proposition that the antecedents of the
excessive fines clause in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the English
Bill of Rights, and Magna Carta applied to civil damages awarded to
private parties.4 9 She placed particular emphasis on the apparently interchangeable use of the terms amercement andfine,5 ° and the imposition of
amercements by the Crown on behalf of private individuals in actions
that later evolved into private civil actions."1 Justice O'Connor also
found support in late-eighteenth-century American usage for arguing
awards based on guidelines developed by the reasoned deliberation of a court or legislature. Id. The
majority opinion, in contrast, suggested that Supreme Court precedent supports closer scrutiny of
punitive damage awards "made pursuant to a statutory scheme," rather than based on the largely
unfettered discretion given to a jury by the common law. Id. at 2921.
45. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. See also supra note 4.
47. Browning-Ferris, 109 S.Ct. at 2925. Cf supra note 37.
48. Browning-Ferris, 109 S.Ct. at 2925-26. Cf supra note 37.
49. Browning-Ferris, 109 S.Ct. at 2926-31.
50. Id. at 2928. To demonstrate the similar meaning of amercement andfine in the sixteenth
century, Justice O'Connor cited Shakespeare as "an astute observer of English law and politics" in
his use of the two words in a passage from Romeo and Juliet:
I have an interest in your hate's proceeding,
My blood for your rude brawls doth lie a-bleeding;
But I'll amerce you with so strong a fine,
That you shall all repent the loss of mine.
Id. (citing W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 3, scene 1, li. 186-89 (1597)). Justice Blackmun aptly if less poetically replied for the majority:
Though Shakespeare, of course,
Knew the Law of his time,
He was foremost a poet,
In search of a rhyme.
Id. at 2915-16 n.7.
51. Id. at 2927-30.
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that when the eighth amendment was
ratified, fines was understood as
2

applying generally to civil damages.1
After demonstrating an historical basis for applying the excessive
fines clause to punitive damages, Justice O'Connor turned to the Court's
precedents to argue that they gave further support for reviewing Kelco's
damage award for excessiveness.1 3 She argued that earlier Supreme
Court decisions had recognized that punitive damages were "privatefines

levied by civil juries"54 and therefore are penal in nature based on the
factors set out in the Mendoza -Martinez case. 5
Justice O'Connor also rejected the majority's distinction between
56
punitive damages awarded to private rather than governmental entities.
She wrote that "[a] governmental entity can abuse its power by allowing

civil juries to impose ruinous punitive damages as a way of furthering the
purposes of its criminal law," 57 and pointed out that it matters little to
one who pays an excessive fine whether the money goes to the government or is directed by the government into the hands of a private party.58

Finally, Justice O'Connor addressed what standards she would apply to determine the excessiveness of a fine.5 9 She first rejected a strict

economic analysis of the effect of punitive damages, writing that "D]ust
as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics, the Eighth Amendment does not incorporate the views of the
Law and Economics School."6 Instead, Justice O'Connor would have
begun by adapting to the excessive fines clause the factors developed by
61
the Court in the context of the cruel and unusual punishments clause
52. Id. at 2930-31.
53. Id. at 2931-33.
54. Id. at 2932 (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979))
(emphasis added in Browning-Ferris).
55. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court described the factors determining whether a sanction is punitive as being:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which is may rationally be connected is assigned to it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned....
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
56. Browning-Ferris,109 S.Ct. at 2932.
57. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
58. Id. at 2933.
59. Id. at 2933-34.
60. Id. at 2933 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
61. Id. at 2933-34 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (setting forth factors
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409,
1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the Solem factors in a civil RICO case)). In Solem, the Court held

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss2/5

8

Woltz: Excessive Fines Clause Revisited: Punitive Damages after Browning

1989]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

and presumably allowing the lower courts to develop a jurisprudence of
excessiveness.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Although Browning-Ferris should preclude further litigation on
whether the excessive fines clause applies to punitive damage awards to
private parties,6" it may encourage further litigation on two important
issues: first, when civil punitive damage awards to the government are
constitutionally excessive, and second, under what circumstances punitive damage awards violate due process.
A.

Punitive Damage Awards to the Government in Civil Cases

A significant part of the federal government's law enforcement efforts may involve civil actions against individuals or corporations, often
based on statutes providing for punitive damages. The Browning-Ferris

case suggests that a majority of the Court remains willing to review punitive damage awards in such civil actions for constitutional excessiveness.6 3 The case takes on added significance when read with another case
decided during the same term, United States v. Halper, 4 in which the
Court limited the amount that may be sought in a civil action from one
who has already been punished for the same offense in a criminal action.6 5 These two cases together may have the effect of limiting the range
of civil actions the government may take against criminal defendants,
and perhaps may require the government to choose whether6 civil or
criminal proceedings against a defendant would be preferable.
Browning-Ferrismay also have implications for statutes that allocate
that the proportionality of a criminal punishment to an offense should be "guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
62. At least litigation based on the excessive fines clause of the United States Constitution is
precluded. State courts applying similar language in state constitutions could, of course, be persuaded by the line of reasoning and historical analysis advocated by Justice O'Connor and others to
limit state law awards of punitive damages on state constitutional grounds.
63. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2914 (1989).
64. 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
65. Id. at 1903.
66. The Court refused to decide whether excessive fines or double jeopardy limits on punitive
damage awards to the government would apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment, but
Justice O'Connor makes a convincing argument in her dissent that the excessive fines clause at least
should be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920-21
nn.21-22, 2925. She also argued that the excessive fines clause should apply to corporations as well
as individuals. Id. at 2925-26.
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a percentage of punitive damage awards to the government.67 The

Court, however, did not have to reach a decision on the issue in the
Browning-Ferriscase, and expressly left the question open for determina-

tion in a future decision.68
B.

Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damages After Browning-Ferris

In Browning-Ferris69 and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. CrenshaW, 70 a total of four justices have expressed a serious concern that punitive damages may under some circumstances violate the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 7' At the same time,
some lower federal courts have been moving to limit punitive damages on
due process grounds.7 2 With such interest in the issue shown by the
Court, it is likely only a matter of time before the Court directly considers what, if any, restrictions due process requires on punitive damages.73
It is unclear exactly what form due process restrictions on punitive
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)(b) (Supp. 1988). This possibility was pointed out by Justice O'Connor in her dissent as well as during the oral arguments in Browning-Ferris. BrowningFerris, 109 S. Ct. at 2933; 57 U.S.L.W. 3699, 3700 (April 25, 1989).
Chief Justice Rehnquist has commented favorably in the past on awarding punitive damages to
the state rather than to private plaintiffs, and might conceivably be reluctant to apply restrictions
based on the excessive fines clause to such a system. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 4, at 443.
68. Browning-Ferris,109 S. Ct. at 2920 n.21. Cf. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1903
n.11 (1989) (refusing to decide whether the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies to
punitive damage awards in qui tam actions).
69. 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was joined in this
opinion by Justice Marshall.
70. 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1655 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice O'Connor was
joined in this opinion by Justice Scalia.
71. Other justices have been critical of allowing punitive damages in various other situations
and on various other grounds. See Note, supra note 4, at 443-44. Particularly significant may be the
general hostility to punitive damages shown by now-Chief Justice Rehnquist in Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 57 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reciting many of the "cogent and persuasive criticisms
that have been offered of punitive damages generally").
72. See, e.g., Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989) (originally
holding that multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct in a mass tort case violated
fundamental fairness), vacated on other grounds, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989). See also In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (advocating the
same).

This judicial activity parallels legislative and state court attempts to limit punitive damages by
raising the standard of proof. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 447 and cases cited infra note 78.
73. See Miller, Shoe Still CouldDrop on Issue ofPunitive Damages, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 21, 1989,
at S-10. Shortly after the decision in Browning-Ferris,however, the Court avoided considering the
issue by rejecting certiorari on three punitive damage cases raising due process claims. See Miller v.
Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989); Metromedia v. April Enters., No. B022890 (Cal. Ct. App. June 9, 1988), stay granted, 109 S. Ct. 212,
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3242 (1989) (stay presented to Justice O'Connor and referred by her to the
Court).
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damages might take, but the comments of Justices Brennan and
74 and Bankers Life7" suggest that the most
O'Connor in Browning-Ferris
likely restriction would be a requirement that juries be told the range of
punitive damages permissible in a case and what factors would make a
particular size of award appropriate. In Browning-Ferris,Justice Brennan seemed most concerned with the lack of guidelines given to juries
awarding punitive damages and the consequent possibility of arbitrary
punishment for conduct society deems repugnant.7 6 This echoes the misgivings expressed by Justice O'Connor in Bankers Life, where she wrote
that because there are often no objective standards for awarding punitive
damages, it is largely unpredictable what the severity of punishment
might be for a given act, and potential defendants77may have no adequate
notice of the possible consequences of their acts.
In addition to the concerns raised by Justices Brennan and
O'Connor, there are a variety of other due process grounds on which
punitive damages might be challenged. Some state courts have, for example, raised the standard of proof in punitive damage cases to clear and
convincing evidence in order to satisfy due process concerns.7 8 It might
be argued further that due process requires some degree of proportionality between actual and punitive damages.79 One might also argue that
the common practice of introducing the wealth of a defendant into evidence in punitive damage cases unfairly prejudices defendants, and may
lead to the bringing of poorly supported punitive damage claims precisely
in order to introduce such prejudicial information.8 ° Finally, there seems
to be support among some of the lower federal courts for limiting multiple punitive damage awards for the same act.8
74. 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring).
75. 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1654 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
76. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923. See also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
77. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). See Note, supra
note 4, at 441-42. See also Comment, Can Punitive DamagesStandardsBe Void for Vagueness?, 63
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 52 (1988).
78. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 332, 723 P.2d 675, 681
(1986); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. 1986); Tuttle v. Raymond,
494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 300 n.23, 294 N.W.2d
437, 458 n.23 (1980). Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (standard of proof
in defamation cases raised to clear and convincing).
79. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 27, Browning-Ferris(No. 88-556) (making due process
arguments very similar to BFI's excessive fines arguments).
80. For a discussion of possible due process grounds for challenging punitive damages, see
Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCasefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,69 VA. L. REV. 269,
291, 295-96 (1983).
81. See supra note 72.
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CONCLUSION

The Browning-Ferriscase removes from the repertoire of constitutional challenges to punitive damages the claim that punitive damages in
suits between private parties violate the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment when they are much larger than the compensatory
damages awarded. The decision suggests, however, that the excessive
fines clause may impose restrictions upon civil actions in which the government is the beneficiary of a punitive damage award. Browning-Ferris
also gives a further indication that when the proper case arises, at least
four justices may be willing to hold that due process requires that punitive damage awards be based on clear and reasoned guidelines given to a
jury and not on the largely unfettered discretion given to juries by the
common law.
Joseph C.M. Woltz
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